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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
---0000000---

DIVEFSIFIED GENERl1.L CORPORA1.'ION, )
a Utah corporation,
)
)

Plaintiff and Appellant, )

District Court No. 67122

)

vs.

)
)

WHITE Bl~RN GOLF COURSE, INC. , a
)
Utah corporation, KEITH B. DOWNS,)
ALBEFT SANOUE, A OK LANDS INCOR- )
PORATED, a Utah corporation, and )
JOHN DOES 1 through 8 in cl usi ve, )

Supreme Court No. 15462

)

Defendants and Respondents.)

Appeal from Summary Judgment of the Second District Court for
Weber County, State of utah
THE HONORABLE RONALD O. HYDE,
Presiding

For the Plaintiff-Appellant
PARSONS &
Attorneys
310 South
Salt Lake

CROWTHER
at Law
Main Street, Suite 1314
City, Utah 84101

For the Defendants-Respondents
PATTERSON, PHILLIPS, GRIDLEY & ECHARD
Attorneys at Law
427 - 27th Street
Ogden, Utah 84401
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SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF U'l'AH
---0000000---

DIV£RSIFIED GEtlERAL CORPORATION,
a Ul 'Lh corr;oration I
Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.

CASE NO. 15462

WHITE BARN GOLF COURSE, INC., a
Uteth corpO:Ci'Ltion, KEITH B. DOWNS,)
Jl.LBEWl' SMW~JE
A OK LAlWS INCOR- )
PORl\TED, a Utoh corporation, and )
JOB'~ DOES 1 through 8, inclusive,)
I

)

Defendants and Respondents.

)

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

ARGUMEHT
Pursuant to the provisions of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Appellant replies to Respondents' Brief as follows:
POINT I
R~SPONDENTS' COHCLUSION THAT THERE IS NO BROKERFilWER DJ S'i'INCTION IN UTAH COMES AS A RESULT
OF RESPONDENTS' FAILURE TO RECOGNIZE THE INTERACTION OF IMPORTANT PUBLIC POLICIES.
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In their Brief, Respondents attempt to persuade the Court
that the principal Utah cases bearing on the

~roker-findPr 1·"
~sue,

namely, Ander_s_on ':::'·Johnson, 108 Uto.h 417, lGO P.2d 725 (194S),
and Chase v. Morcran, 9 Utah 2d 125, 339 P. 2d 1019 (1959), do not
esto.blish or recognize a broker-finder distinction, and that the
Washington courts have rejected California's longstanding
recognition of that distinction.

The reasoning of Respondents

in support of those propositions suggests a failure to discern
both of the important public policies viewed by this Court and
others in resolving such cases.

Once the interplay of these

policies is understood o.nd seen as the backdrop to the

decisi~s

in these cases, it becomes clear that the finder-broker distincti

exists in all three states mGntioned and it also becomes possiWs
to spot the crucial facts which have caused the courts to
decide that the broker-finder distinction does or does not

app~

in a given case.

In each case cited by both Appellants and Respondents, there

is this basic factual similarity:

The first party renders a

valuable "finding" service to the second party for which, by agn
ment, compensation is to be paid, but for which the second par~
refuses to pay because of a licensing statute which, the second
party argues, requires the first party to be licensed before
rendering such service and collecting a fcco or commission.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-2-

In each such case, therefore, the Court is faced with two
com~ctlng policy considerations:

First, the policy of enforcing

licensing stalutcs enacted to protect the public, and second,
the policy of enforcing valid contractual obligations.

The

question then is 11hat test doe?s the Court use to determine
preference for one or the other policy.

This Court has stated

that "in the absence of compelling considerations of policy to
the contrary, it is the duty of the Court to give effect to the
covenants which the parties have agreed to in their contract."
Lundstrom~·

339.

Radio Corporation of America, 17 Ut 2d 114, 405 P.2d

This means that in cases like the one at bar involving a

"finder", the court will enforce the contract unless the policy
of enforcing the broker's statutes is compelling.

The resolution

of such cases, therefore, boils down to a determination of when
the policy of enforcing the broker's statutes is compelling.
The cases cited by both Appellant and Respondent establish
clearly that enforcement of the broker's statutes is compelling
only wh0re the party rendering the "finder's" service has had
ilie authority to do more, or has actually done more, than find
and introduce; conversely, where such party has done nothing more
than find and introduce and has not had authority to do any more
ilian that, the courts have allowed recovery on the basis that the
dem0nds of the broker's statutes were not compelling and thus
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contract policy considerations prevail.
The reasoning implicit in the foregoing tesl is that where
the party is truly a "finder" only, his infhK~ncE' is so remote
and the potential dangcr to the public so small that the need
for enforcing the licensing statute is not compelling and the
policy of enforcing valid contracts, therefore, prevails.
reasoning is sound and yields justice.

Such

An even casual reading o'.

the licensing requirements of the broker's statutes makes it
clear that they are designed to secure the competence and charact,
of those who earn a fee or commission for reprcsc'ntinq and

neg~

tiating for the parties in oftentimes complicated real estate
transactions.

Clearly one who does no more than find and intro-

duce such parties need have no expertise in financial or real
estate matters and the opportunity for dishonest dealing will
seldom, if ever, present itself.

Rather, it is where: one furnis;.,

analysis, discusses and negotiates terms and counsels the parties
on methods of transacting the sale, arranges the financing

a~

documentation, and uses the skills of salesmanship to convince
the parties to consummate the deal, or where the party is
authorized to do any of the foregoing, that his competence ~d
character must be assured.

The broker's statutes were designed

to give such assurances, but not to work unjust enrichment wbere
such assurance is unnecessary.

The broker's statutes restrict
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the freedom of the State's citizens to transact business with one
another and should not, therefore, be extended beyond that coverage
necessary to afford the protection for which they were designed;
~

do so is to cause citizens to lose respect for the law and

the courts and to nullify the good intentions of the legislature.
In

~2dersen,

the court granted recovery to the appellant and

specificully stated that he could not reasonably be viewed as
having purticipated in the negotiation of the transaction.
at 729.

Supr~,

The real importance of Ander~i::~, however, is the con-

curring opinion of Justice Wade in which he carefully points out
why the policy of enforcing the broker's statutes is not compelling
in that CCise:
A reading of the statutes regulating real
estate brokers makes it apparent that they were enacted
for the benefit of the public to protect them from
dishonest and unscrupulous real estate agents. Such
protection of the public is not needed from the casual
or remote influence of a stenographer or of a person
who r1k1y wish to deal with him. Neither the stenograpfrernorthe man who introduces the broker in the
examples I have mentioned are active participants in
any contract affecting real estate or any liability of
the persons entering into such contracts or listings.
The-de:l-llnqs which the statutes aim to protect the
publJ_c 1n are those which result in legal liabilities
between the parties.
Nothing the stenographer or the
rnan\·/h0 introduces the real ('State broker does has
thate-tfcct.
This is true even though the real estate
broker-contracts to pay the man wh~ introduces him a
part of his commission in the event he makes a sale.
(emphasis added) .
I

~~ :':'._· Johnson, supra at 729-30.
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In Chase, the second major Utah casC' in which Justice Wade
writes for the majority and in harmony with his prior opinion
in l\ndersen, the Court found that the appellant lwd been author-

in Chase was given authority by his prlncjpal to actually sell
or negotiate the sale of the leases involved.
It is clear fr0m the above evidence thilt appellant
and his associates were authorized to sell or negotiate
the sale of the leases involved.
Such an aqrccmcnt
contemplo.ted rr,ore tlian th2 mere findTn(;--or-.lntrocfoction
~-~-bu11 ~:_!_ an~ cle_2:1._i:-_~~--yz,s ti-lc-;-_::~o-rt

within the def ini_!ic·:1 of "Rea 1
above.
(emphasis added)
Chas~~·

~organ,

?T act-i~v1 t)~-~e-;;;:;r;,ced

Esto.te-JJroJ~" --q-~otc_J __

-

supra at 1021.

Respondents in the case at bar have tried to

minimiZE~

the

clarity of the foregoing languo.ge of the court in Chase with the
assertion that the authority of negotiation and sale held by
appellant in Chase wo.s simply an additional ground for bringing
appellant within the ambit of the statute.

However, a reading

of the plain language of Chase makes that contention untenable.
Respondents also seize upon the following language from
Chase in an attempt to escape the clear meaning of the case:
Appellant contends the court erred in concluding
that he was precluded from recovery h2cause he had
not obtained a real estate broker's license bec2use (1)
the real estate broker's statutes do not il[)ply to one
W110Tnerely intrndUccs a buyer toan-u;::;;:;-,:;-r;a-i1d(TJnor
to transactions in the oiland gas-bt1sl11css; and (3)

-6-
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because oil and gas leases are not real estate. We
fincl no mer j t to any of these contentions.
(emphasis
adc1C::-rT) •
~.£. ~·

Mor,_si_an, supra at 1020.

Respondent insists that the foregoing passage demonstrates
the court's rejection of the broker-finder distinction; however,
Respondent's interpretation cannot be made to square with Chase
as a whole! nor with Justice lvade 's comments in Andersen.

The

obvious reason why the court found no merit in appellant's first
contention is because appellant was authorized to do more than
find and introduce a buyer.

To restate the test: if one does not

have authority to do any more than find and introduce and does
not actually do more than that, enforcement of the broker's
statutes is not compelling and the policy of enforcing valid
contracts is favored.

On the other hand, where a party has

authority to negotiate or sell, i.e. do more than find and introduce, or where the party actually does negotiate or sell, the
policy of enforcing the broker's statutes is compelling and must
prevc:il.
This test is precisely that which has been long espoused
by the California courts:

Nevertheless, when viewed in the light of the
competing public policies the finder's exception is
not anomalous.
Fundamental to our 'law is the basic
principle that persons should perform their contracts,
and when they breach their agreements, action should
ordinarily lie to enforce contractual duties. On the
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c;ithcr hand, the prornot ion of cc;r.1pctcncy and intcgri tv
in thos~' cal led upon !Jy. the public to perform co::ipl c~
duties involv1 ng trust is a c:alutary puq•ose, ilnd
the policy undcrly:[n<J tl1c! licensing statulcs n1ust l_)c
given full effect.
Nc~,_lhc_:_r_C_<:)_r1c,idc'r,-ihon:~ ol cornpctency nor of trust aro.' of :i r.11_)ort :-J),-:z;-\:~)=(:---fr;;-;---1)])i~.'r
t.:1bn~i s rne-rci}~ to ·--;:-;e:·c-:,-k-o\i c;·-1 ()ca i c-;-f:-fr1 Cf3]1'.f-_]_]]t
d uce il buy0r, sel 1cJr, l>eirr0\::c:-r-:--Ci1:-lc·11(1;.1:---t;_)-11Ts __ _

ro-

~~~l~~f:~!-~;~:;~1~~{~21 ~-f~-gM,~~l-~-1~~~ 1 ,~~~c~;~,~T,f:-~~-;~~ ls.
By e__r::f:orcin_':l the pror:t:Lsc~ to--jiay -;_-)-f}]\(J81-=-•c;-foc~-~-ctt cc t -t:ot=_}\c ]J-01.lc y-·;-T0n:=-o-1: c 01:~~_,n;: c1Tcc)n t 1 acts

9JVC

in cases where the pol ic-yl1nder1·;:--imr-thc~l-ic;::l;:~1:-;,~l-
stattl.tedoes not d~~~t1·,-::--,:;pplL_:-TC::-rr1pl1ilsis -ad~~le-2n'
Tyrone v. Kel;i,_ey, 106 Cal. Rptr.

761,

507 P.2d 65, at 72 (1973).

POINT II

THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE UTAH AND CALIFOENIA
BROKER'S ST~TUTES REPUDIATES RESPONDE~TS'
ARGUMENT THNr 'I'HEJ\E lUill RELEVANT ANLJ CR\JCIJ,L
DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN THEM.
Respondents attempt to lessen the cogency of the Californic,
cases by asserting incredibly that there is a substantial diffrn
between the California and Utah broker's statutes.

Appellant

submits that the language of the respective stotutes speak
plainly for the conclusion that the statutes are in effect
virtually identical (see page 7 of Respondent's Brief).

POINT III
THE CASE WHICH RESPONDENTS RELY ON SO HEAVILY
ACTUALLY CORROBORATES THE POSI'l'Irnl Tl,KE;'l !3Y
APPELLANT.
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As final support for its position, Appellant would draw the
court's all~ntlon to the very case which Respondents so emphatically point to in support of their position; namely, the Washington
case of s;E;<~11rn~_r:_ ~- Skagit ValJ_c:_y_ Lumber Co., 162 Washington 677,

P.37G (1931).

With this case Respondents wish to convince the

court that the other states have repudiated the California rule
that fjJtdci-s arc an exception to the broker's statutes.

(It is

remarked that Respondents directly admit that California allows
for find5ra and finder's fees.

"The California statute and the

Californiu c2se law allow for finder's fees."

Page 7 of Respon-

dents' Brief.
In citing the Granuner case, counsel for Respondents writes
as follO\·IS:
Tlw Supreme Court (in Grammer) listened to and
repudiated all of the arguments proposed by counsel in
this case.
In determining if the salesman in that
cuse WJS acting as a broker, or could avoid the consequences of the broker law by being a finder, the court
held the finder-broker distinction did not lie and the
activities covered in the case were that of a broker.
ResµoncJents'

Brief, page 8.

Counsel is partially right and partially wrong.

Counsel is

right in slating that the court held that the finder-broker
distinction did not lie in Grammer and that the activities of
the appcl lant were that of a broker, but counsel is wrong in
assurni TlCJ tlwt the

\~ashington

court repudiated the same arguments
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propounded by Appellant in the case at bar: the issue and principles of law are the same, but the activities of the appellant
in Grammer and those of the l\ppcllant in the cu.so at bar were
profoundly and significantly different.

It is submithec\ that

the l'ilashington court would recosrnizc the broker-finder distinct['.
in a proper case and counsel for Rcsponden ts adrni ts that by
implication in his statement.
did not present such a case.

The u.ppellant in GranirnE!'.'.", however,,
The facts in that case, as found

by the court, were that appellant had authorization to

negotia~

and obtain offers, i.e. actuaJ.ly offer the property for sale
subject only to final approval by the defendant-owner; further,
appellant actually prepared the seller's property for presentaL:
to prospective purchasers by compiling data and information,
cruised the timber, prepared estimates of the costs of procuring,
manufacturing and disposing of logs and lumber, obtained optioos
on other timber and consummated the sale.

!

In other words, the

appellant was authorized to do and essentially did all that a
broker does, being limited only by seller's right to subsequent!;'
approve or reject the sale.

It is no wonder that the Washington

court decried appellant's description of himself as a "finder" he was no such thing.
It is apparent that the facts in ~ra~•':E are not the same
nor even similar to those in the case at bar whe~e Appellant
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1'1

35

contractually limited to doing and actually did no more than
find

pot~ntiQl

buyers and refer or introduce them to the

Respondents, who thereupon presented the property, negotiated
all terms and offers, and consummated the sale.
CONCLUSION
The case law in Utah, California and Washington is harmonious
and establishes the finder exception where the purported finder
has neither done nor been authorized to do more than simply find
and introduce.
In conclusion, Appellant urges the Court to consider the case
law and the lack of compelling considerations for the application
of the broker's statutes to Appellant, to be mindful of the great
inequity and unjust enrichment which will result if Respondents
are perrni tted to flaunt and evade their valid and otherwise
binding contractual obligations, and to rule accordingly.
DATED

this~t/?

day of March, 1978.
Respectfully submitted,
PARSONS & CROWTHER
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CEH'I'JFICi\Tl, OF l-11\ILING

I hereby certify that I mailed a true ancl correct copy of
the foregoing Appellant's Roply Brief to all of the named
Defendants-Respondents by mailing the same to the office of
Patterson, Phillips, Gri dlcy

&

Echard, attorney;: for Defendants-

Respondents, 427 - 27th Street, Ogden, Utah g4qo1, placing each
copy in a properly addressed, postage prepaid envelope and
depositing said envelope: in t11e Uni led States rn<eil this
day of March, 1978.
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